Article

 

The russian firm’s organisational links and behaviour (p.123-137)

by

Leonidas Maroudas, University of the Aegean, Business Administration Department

Yorgos Rizopoulos, CRIISEA, University of Picardie

Keywords : Russia, firm, transition, managerial strategies, manufacturing

JEL classification : D21, J53, L21, P31

Abstract

Although the interdependence forms and the interaction elements between external and internal relations developed by Russian enterprises are gradually changing - as the organisational strategies by which they are governed are being transformed - certain relatively stable characteristics can be observed during the first period of the economic transformation). These characteristics are the tendency to bolster economic networks, the high percentage of inter-enterprise (and to a smaller extent intra-enterprise) transactions represented by barter exchange and the relative maintenance of the worker collective’s size. These features result from the incessant renegotiation process, between the various participants, of the internal and external organisational equilibrium’s terms. They constitute a major pattern of the organisational behaviour of the Russian manufacturing firm during the 1991-1998 period.

 

 

Institutional and organisational dynamics in the east german transformation (p.139-171)

by

Agnès Labrousse, Centre Marc Bloch (Berlin) and CEMI-EHESS (Paris)

Keywords : East Germany, formal and informal rules, path dependency, industrial relations, labour market, work organisation

JEL classification : B52, J21, J22, J5, P31

Abstract

Focusing mainly on industrial relations and work organisation within firms, the aim of this paper is to shed some light on the complex interrelations between different institutional and organisational levels in the East German transformation. On the theoretical level, this paper will attempt to adapt the path dependency criteria, developed by Arthur, to the institutional sphere and to accurately characterise notions such as rules or organisations, often used in a loose manner. On the empirical level, using quantitative and qualitative material (interviews in particular), this paper scrutinises institutional and organisational change, in order to elucidate some distinctive features of the emerging East German capitalism. East Germany was, and still is, involved in some elementary process common to other countries experiencing transformation (notably a deep institutional and organisational change and path-dependency effects) but with strongly marked specific features related to its absorption by the West German state. But the transfer of West German formal institutions is part of the story, not the end of it. The “overnight” transplantation of formal institutions can be contrasted with the potentially time-expensive change of organisations and informal institutions. The interplay between formal and informal rules, has led, in East Germany to characteristic original hybrid combinations, that is, functioning processes which are neither reducible to the West German system nor to Eastern legacies.

 

 

Corporate governance and governance paradigms (p.173-196)

by

Bruno Dallago, Department of Economics, University of Trento.

Keywords : Corporate governance, shareholders, stakeholders, innovation

JEL classification : D23, G34, P12

Abstract

Three main governance perspectives exist. It is difficult to integrate them, since they consider the nature and functions of the firm in dissimilar ways and originate different governance choices. The first of these is the standard shareholder value analysis, which concentrates on the consequences of the separation between ownership and control and of contract incompleteness. With dispersed ownership, the crucial problem of corporate governance is to give shareholders proper incentives to supply firms with capital. The solution is to allocate control rights to shareholders, make information standardized, transparent and free and rely on the market for corporate control. The second is the stakeholder interest perspective according to which, the firm includes different stakeholders who have to implement some kind of firm specific investment. The firm is seen as a coalition of different competences, capabilities, roles and interests and corporate governance is concerned with how the allocation of residual rights of control to different stakeholders affects economic performance. And thirdly is the (post-)Schumpeterian innovative firm perspective, which concentrates on the governance of the process through which resources are developed as well as utilized in the economy. A system of corporate governance supports innovation by generating financial commitment, organizational integration and insider control.

 

 

Corporate control in the russian industry : actors and mechanisms (p.197-215)

by

Tatiana G. Dolgopiatova, State University - Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia)

Keywords : industry, enterprise, corporate governance, property rights

JEL classification : L2, P41, P42

Abstract

This paper analyses both the emergence of relations of ownership, models of corporate control in Russian industrial enterprises, and the underlying mechanisms of corporate governance that are used by owners to overcome managers’ opportunism on the one hand and by managers to oppose owners’ control on the other. The analysis was performed with due consideration to the processes of stock concentration and redistribution between insider and outsider owners. It is based on the results of about 300 formalized and 19 in-depth interviews with top managers of joint-stock companies conducted by the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the State University - Higher School of Economics in 1999-2001.

 

 

Tolling arrangements in the russian industries : an institutional perspective (p.217-240)

by

Svetlana Avdasheva, Institute for Industrial and Market Studies, State University – Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia)

Keywords : tolling contracts, transition, Russian industries, disorganization, restructuring, ownership rights, vertical integration

JEL classification : L22, L42, M130, P31

Abstract

This paper presents an overview of a specific type of arrangement for input supply widely applied in the Russian and Ukrainian industries. Over the last five years the arrangement, known as tolling contract, has been accounting for a large and stable share of the total volume of several homogenous industrial outputs. I will hereby examine the contract as a way of reallocation, in the short-run, of property rights to enterprises having refining capacities. Tolling can also be considered as a tool of vertical integration. It enables the supplier of input to neutralize “double marginalization” in a vertical chain and therefore increases both the profit of supplier and social welfare. Usage of tolling does not provide a “vertical profit” in the sense of Mathewson and Winter, however, control over input supply helps a new company to reduce sunk costs, making the acquisition of refining capacities unnecessary. Evidence from the Russian food-processing industry supports the view that tolling is a mean of entering the market by new firms, and at the same time of restructuring refining enterprises.