Patterns of Corruption (p.11-31) ![[Fichier PDF]](images/pdf.png) |
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| by |
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| Economakis George, University of Patras |
| Rizopoulos Yorgos, Université of Picardy |
| Sergakis Dimitrios, Université of Picardy |
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| Keywords : Corruption patterns, Institutional determinants, Public/private interactions |
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| JEL classification : B52, D73, O17 |
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| Abstract |
| The ambiguities that characterize the economic significance and impact of corruption make it necessary to develop a coherent and more satisfactory analytical framework. We argue that the institutional structure that governs the interactions between players and, more particularly, public and private actors is a decisive factor of corrupt practices and largely influences the nature of corruption. On this basis, we propose a taxonomy of the different corruption patterns as a function of two institutional parameters, namely the structural features of the interest intermediation systems and the degree of institutional stability. |
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| A Dynamic Analysis of Country Clusters, the Role of Corruption, and Implications for Global Firms (p.33-60) |
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| by |
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| Grein Andreas, Baruch College, CUNY |
| Sethi S. Prakash , |
| Tatum Lawrence G. , |
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| Keywords : Economic development, Corruption, Country clustering |
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| JEL classification : F23, M16, O17 |
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| Abstract |
| Country clustering has been explored as a technique for reducing the complexity and exploring relationships between countries. Rather than examining country level indicators in isolation, clustering offers the opportunity to determine which countries are similar and explore the relationships between variables driving cluster membership. We examine 39 countries using economic, technological, cultural, demographic and quality of life variables. Corruption is captured using Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index (CPI). The data cover the years 1995, 2000, and 2005. Principal components analysis reveals 3 factors, and the role of CPI (in terms of eigen weightings) is relatively stable over the period studied. Using factor scores for clustering, we observe cluster membership differences across years and note that diverging CPI scores are associated with countries that appear to be growing more similar. |
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| The Changing Contours of Corruption in Russia: Informal Intermediaries in State-Business Relations (p.61-82) |
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| Olimpieva Irina , St. Petersburg Center for Independent Social Research |
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| Keywords : Corruption, Small business, Informality, Intermediaries, Russia |
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| Abstract |
| Despite extensive academic and media discussion about corruption in Russia, there has been little analysis of how the corruption process works and what makes it so deeply entrenched. One reason is that the notion of corruption is often used as an umbrella term to cover a variety of fundamentally different phenomena that have one formal feature in common – using an official position to gain private profit. Often overlooked in the discussion is the fact that the corruption market is constantly changing, not only in terms of the scale and volume of corruption (which is almost impossible to measure), but, more importantly, in terms of substantial changes in its forms, mechanisms and content, and the emergence of new informal actors and even institutions. There are constantly emerging new forms of informal interactions, along with new actors – informal intermediaries – which facilitate a variety of informal relationships in the business sphere. This paper provides an empirically-based sociological analysis of the phenomenon of informal intermediaries and of the “intermediaries’ boom” – an explosive growth of intermediaries recently transforming the Russian business environment using data from a study of small and medium business in St. Petersburg. The emergence and institutionalization of informal mediating is considered a new stage in the evolution of corruption in state-business relations in Russia. |
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| Can E-governance hold back the Relationships between Stakeholders of Corruption? An Empirical Study of a Developing Country (p.83-106) |
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| by |
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| Iqbal Sohel , Department of Public Administration, Korea University, Seoul |
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| Keywords : Corruption, e-governance, stakeholders, developing country, Bangladesh |
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| JEL classification : H1, O3 |
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| Abstract |
| The developing countries are suffering from severe corruption, which decreases the rate of foreign direct investment (FDI) along with per capita income, and increases the gap between rich and poor. Corruption slows down the development and makes good governance helpless. In the developing countries, how serious the corruption is? What are the causes of and suggestions to reduce corruption? Who are the stakeholders of corruption and between which players does corruption have a chance to happen? This study finds out all the answers considering the perspective of Bangladesh as a representation of developing countries. This article also identifies the stakeholders of corruption, explains why e-governance is important for reducing corruption, and shows how e-governance restricts stakeholders from corrupt actions in developing countries. The governments of developing countries should take serious actions to imply e-governance for limiting corruption. |
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| Can the exchange rate regime influence corruption? (p.107-124) |
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| by |
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| Popkova Katherina , University of Siegen, Department of Economics |
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| Keywords : Exchange Rate Regime, Monetary Policy, Fiscal Policy, Corruption |
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| JEL classification : E52, E58, E61, E63, F33 |
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| Abstract |
| This paper analyses the influence of the exchange rate regime of a country on the level of tolerated corruption with a special focus on the interdependency of monetary and fiscal policies. Using a simple theoretical framework based on Barro-Gordon-Model I compare independent monetary policy with a tight peg arrangement in order to find out which regime is more likely to induce governments to intensify the fight against corruption. It is shown that if corruption has a considerable positive impact on output, a tight peg regime can increase tolerated corruption. However, if corruption has a negative effect on output, a pegged exchange rate regime will lead to a lower level of tolerated corruption. The issue of particular interest appears to be the finding that a strong positive impact of corruption on output can induce governments to choose a fix peg regime while a weak positive impact of corruption (and a negative influence of corruption even more) provides an incentive to keep monetary independence. |
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